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Recent Developments in the Law of
Privilege and Fair Comment
WALTER JENSEN, JR.*
Liberty of the press is a cherished right. Attempts by the sover-
eign to interfere with freedom of public expression have been com-
batted since the days of the infamous Star Chamber. The danger
has existed for many centuries and still exists today. However,
enlightened public opinion must not only guard against encroach-
ments on freedom of the press by governmental edict, statute, or
control but also must defend with equal vigor against the erosion
of this right by private litigants through use of the libel laws.
By over-zealous use of the libel laws, private litigants pose a threat
to freedom of speech and of the press which can equal or exceed
that of stringent governmental control. Private litigants can easily
discourage free public discussion, criticism, and the dissemination
of ideas through the printed word. The libel suit can become a
dangerous weapon! It poses both a threat and a challenge not
only to the journalist, but to every citizen.
The constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press requires a
broad interpretation of the defenses of "privilege" and "fair com-
ment." A narrow interpretation of the defense of privilege can
restrict liberty of the press by subjecting newspapers and other
commentators to numerous expensive suits for damages. A news-
paper publisher may be discouraged from publishing a commen-
tary on matters of public conern, hence, he may decide that rather
than risk a suit for thousands of dollars in damages, he would
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1. In a frightening discussion which should serve as a warning to Americans, Pro-
fessor David delineates the past European experience in the use of the libel laws by Fas-
cists and other groups, as a major political weapon of oppression and propaganda. See
Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
1085-1123 (1942). In a subsequent article, the same author examines defamation, privilege
and fair comment on the American scene. See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation:
Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1282-1318 (1942). Defamation is a
standard device of political propaganda. See Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of
Political Extremieim in European Democracies, 38 COLUM. L. Rv. 591-622 (1938).
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not publish the questionable material at all.2 The general public
would thus be deprived of newsworthy information.
On March 9, 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck a significant blow for freedom of speech and of the press.
In the case of New York Times v Sullivan,3 the High Court held
that a public official may not recover damages for untrue state-
ments of fact made by newspapers and by other critics of his
official conduct unless the words were prompted by actual malice.
This momentous decision should become a significant addition to
the formidable bulwark of decisions, statutes, and constitutional
provisions which already protect the right of the citizen and journa-
list to speak out on matters of public interest and concern. Con-
siderable doubt still remains concerning the breadth and scope of
the Court's decision. The commentator who believes that he now
has a license to say anything he pleases concerning public officials
without verifying the accuracy of his assertions of fact may indeed
be headed for trouble. The purpose of this discussion is to ex-
amine the traditional privilege of fair comment and the extent to
which it has been modified by this decision.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
The significance of freedom of speech and of the press as a
treasured heritage was succinctly stated by Thomas Jefferson: 4
The people are the only censors of their governors...
people should be given full information of their affairs,
through the channel of public papers, and to contrive that
those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.
The basis of our government being the opinion off the people,
the very first object should be to keep that right; and were
it left to me to decide whether we should have a government,
without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter . . . . No
government ought to be without censors; and where the press
is free, no one ever will.
Included in the charters and bills of rights of many of our
colonies, which later became states in the United States of America,
were provisions that guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
When the Constitution was ratified by the thirteen colonies, pro-
visions concerning freedom of speech and of the press were omitted.
Alexander Hamilton believed that liberty of speech and of the
press need not be specifically mentioned in the Constitution. 5 Thomas
2. John M. Hall, Preserving Liberty of the Press by the Defense of Privilege in
Libel Actions, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 227 (1938).
3. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
4. 18 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, iii (Monticello Edition: Washington, D. C.:
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, (1904).
5. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, 559 (Washington, D. C.: National Home Li-
brary Foundation (1937).
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Jefferson represented the contrary view which was based on mis-
trust of a highly centralized government; therefore, he insisted that
a provision guaranteeing these liberties be included in the first
ten amendments, later to be known as the Bill of Rights.8
Freedom of speech and of the press are among our most
jealously guarded rights. These rights are guaranteed by the first
amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that
Congress shall make no law which abridges freedom of speech or
of the press.7 In their respective bills of rights, the constitutions
of the individual states include provisions which prohibit enactment
of laws which would limit these freedoms. The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the U. S. Constitution forbids a
state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. The rights of freedom of speech and of the
press are included within the purview of those "liberties" protected
against unreasonable restriction by state action through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Those who would
destroy liberty of speech and of the press should remember the
admonition of former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the
United States Supreme Court: 9
... imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the con-
stitutional rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political dis-
cussion, to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be
obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the
Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.
Freedom of speech and of the press concerning public matters is
preserved by a broad interpretation of privilege, which is the right
to speak and to criticize.
PRIVILEGE: A DEFENSE TO LIBEL
The concept of privilege as a defense to libel is based on a
broad public policy which encourages free and open discussion.
The late Chief Justice Taft, when a judge of the U. S. Court of
Appeals, described the manner in which individual rights are
sometimes sacrificed to the public good:
. . . the existence and extent of privilege in communications
are determined by balancing the needs and good of society
6. 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, op. cit. supra at 387.
7. 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people Peaceably to assemble, or to petition the government for a redress of
grievances."
8. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
9. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365; 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937).
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against the right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation
when he has done nothing which ought to injure it . . ..
In the leading case of Coleman v MacLennan,," Justice Burch also
clarified the conflicting interests involved:
The importance to the state and to society of such discussions
is so vast and the advantages derived are so great that they
more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private per-
sons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury
to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The
public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance
of injury to private character is so small, that such discus-
sion must be privileged ....
The doctrine of privileged communications recognizes that oc-
casional injustice to an individual's good name will occur when
published words are, in fact, defamatory; however, a wise public
policy encourages unfettered discussion and interchange of ideas
as basic to the public interest. Since the theory of privilege as-
sumes that the public welfare will be benefited by disclosure of
information, a qualified privilege relieves the commentator from
legal liability if the occasion warrants.
In the law of libel and slander, a privileged communication
is one which would be defamatory and hence subject to suit for
damages if it were not for the circumstances or occasion under
which it was made. The concept of privilege is important only
when the words are both defamatory and untrue. If the statement
made by the defendant is true, then no need for the defense of
privilege exists. Privileged communications are divided into two
general classes: (1) words which are absolutely privileged, and
(2) words which are conditionally or qualifiedly privileged. The
journalist is primarily concerned with qualified or conditional
privilege.
Legislative and judicial proceedings and acts of state confer an
absolute privilege upon its participants; hence, the words of legis-
lators, judges, counsel, and witnesses are not subject to suit for
damages as long as pertinent to the issues being tried or discussed.
Absolute privilege protects the publication of defamatory matter
even though it be both false and malicious. The privilege is based
on public policy which permits those engaged in the administration
of justice and formulation of our laws to speak candidly and act
openly without fear of civil or criminal suit. The rule of absolute
10. Post Publishing Company v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (1893); For a general dis-
cussion of the basic differences between absolutc and conditional privilege, see Note, 19
ILL. L. REv. 684 (1928).
11. 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, 286 (1908). This is the leading case for the minor-
Ity view concerning criticisrp qf public officials. It has been recently adopted by the U. S,
Supreme Court.
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privilege is strictly construed and is confined to those narrow limits
of public concern in which the administration of justice or public
service requires complete immunity.
12
A conditional or qualified privilege assumes that the statement
made would be the proper subject of a suit for defamation under
ordinary circumstances; however, the speaker claims a qualified
protection because of the special occasion under which the words
were spoken or printed. A qualified privilege includes all state-
ments made in good faith concerning any subject matter in which
he owes a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.
The duty owed may be of a legal, moral, or social character.
A conditionally privileged statement includes the following: (1) When
an interest to be upheld exists. (2) The statements are restricted
to this purpose. (3) The statements are made only to the proper
person. (4) The statements are made in good faith.1" Illustrative
examples of conditional or qualified privilege are: fair, nonmalicious
and accurate reports of legislative and judicial proceedings; the
fair and accurate report of a grand jury when presented to the
court for official consideration; reports of divorce proceedings;
reports of proceedings before a police magistrate; and, criticism
of the qualifications and actions of candidates for public office and
incumbent public officials.
A conditional or qualified privilege protects the speaker or pub-
lisher of defamatory words unless actual malice is shown.14 If the
statement is motivated by malice, or is made in reckless disregard
as to its truth or falsity, or in utter disregard of the rights of the
person injured, the qualified privilege is forfeited. 15 Because the
doctrine of conditional or qualified privilege is based on public in-
terest in freedom of discussion, an occasional injury to a person's
reputation is permitted; however, when the speaker or publisher
is motivated by hatred or malice the underlying purpose of the
defense of privilege is defeated. Therefore, "malice" or "wrong
motive," if shown to exist, will deprive the speaker of the shield
of privilege.16 The existence of malice may be inferred from the
violent or excessive character of the language used, from evidence
of previous hostility or ill-will on the part of the defendant, or
from an absence of probable cause for believing the words to be
12. Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954).
13. 33 AM. Jun. Libel & Slander § 126 (1959).
14. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Watson, 55 F.2d 184 (1932).
15. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Yount, 66 F.2d 700 (1933).
16. The ambiguous word "malice," sometimes called "express malice" or "malice In
fact," is not always used in a precise manner. For a scholary discussion of what Is meant
by "malice" and its effect on the defense of conditional privilege, see Jeremiah Smith,
Are Charges Against The Moral Character Of A Candidate For An Elective Office Con-
ditionally Privileged? 18 MICH. L. REv. 1-15 (1919). The author prefers the phrase
"wrong motive" as the best description of malicious conduct Also, see John E. Hallen,
Character Of Belief Necessary For The Conditional Privilege In Defamation, 25 ILL.
L. REV. 865-876 (1939). Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 929-931 (1956).
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true. 17 When the words are conditionally privileged, the plaintiff
must prove the existence of actual malice to defeat the privilege;
the same rule applies when a newspaper has a qualified privilege. 8
It is the prerogative of the court to determine whether an occasion
exists which warrants a privilege; it is the function of the jury to
decide, as a question of fact, whether express malice exists.19 It
should be emphasized that although the presence of malice will
defeat a qualified or conditional privilege, it will not affect the
existence of an absolute privilege. 20
FAIR COMMENT
Fair comment, which is another defense to suits for defamation,
has its origin in the common law, in the U. S. Constitution, and
in the individual state constitutions. Matters of public concern and
interest are the proper subject of fair comment and honest crit-
icism. When fair and honest comments on such matters are made
they are privileged, even though not true in fact. To be legally
acceptable as a defense, fair comment must include the following:
(1) The criticism must relate to a matter of public interest and
concern. (2) The criticism, which cannot be based on malice,
must be the honest opinion of the critic or writer. (3) The com-
ment must not be based on misstatement of fact. (4) The criticism
should be directed not against the individual but rather against
the public work, performance, or act itself. (5) The comment
must not impute dishonest or corrupt motives.
The defenses of fair comment and privilege have both similar-
ities and differences. 21 In communications which are privileged, the
libelous and defamatory words are excused by law. In fair com-
ment the words, which are often defamatory and libelous, are
excused by the law of privilege. Fair comment, as a legal defense,
is available to a journalist, publisher, or individual as long as it
pertains to matters which are of the public interest and also
represents the critic's honest opinion. In contrast, privilege exists
only under certain circumstances where the occasion warrants or
because public policy demands disclosure. Privilege and fair com-
ment are alike in that the existence of express malice will destroy
either of the defenses. When reporting legislative, executive, or
judicial proceedings, the commentator should be careful to confine
17. Kenny v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1923); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S.
187, 25 L. Ed. 116 (1879).
18. City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S.E.2d 1 (1949) ; Broking v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P.2d 413 (1953).
19. Jones v. Express Publishing Company, 87 Cal. App. 246, 262 Pac. 78 (1927). For
a discussion of the function of judge and jury in defamation cases, see Leon Green, Re-
lational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 314-353 (1935).
20. Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918).
21. For a detailed discussion of the defense of fair comment and criticism, see John
Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAs L. REV. 41-100 (1929) ; See Notes, 26 Mims. L. REv. 709
(1927) ; 11 MINN. L. REV. 474 (1927) ; 62 HARV. L. ]REV. 1207 (1949) ; 37 Gno. L. J. 404(1949).
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his report to events which are recorded on the official records as
having occurred and not to state another's opinion as to what oc-
curred. In contrast, fair comment is a conclusion or opinion based
on factual information.
Fair comment and criticism must be confined to matters of
public interest or of general concern, as distinguished from matters
of only private concern. Books, plays, and paintings which are
exhibited to the public and which seek public approval, are matters
of public concern and may be fairly commented upon or criticized.
If the subject matter has not been published or does not invite
public scrutiny, it is a private matter which may not be comment-
ed upon. For example, the personal correspondence of an author
is ordinarily not subject to comment or analysis.
Other illustrative examples of subjects and persons which may
be criticized are actors, public exhibits, architecture of public build-
ings, school football teams, clergymen in their ministerial duties,
public officers, and candidates for public office. 22
When an artist or author submits his work for public scrutiny
or approbation, he must accept both praise and blame for the merits
and weaknesses of his creations. The commentary may be caustic,
severe, and bitter. The critic may use ridicule, sarcasm, exaggera-
tion, and invective, as long as the criticism is relevant to the work
being criticized.2 3 However, the critic may not use his privilege
of fair comment as a cloak for a malicious personal attack on
the author himself.24 To come under the protection of fair com-
ment, the criticism must be "fair." The legal requirement of what
is "fair" comment is not reasonableness but rather is an absence
of malice.22 A jury may conclude that his extreme criticism is
prompted by personal malice rather than by the expression of an
honest opinion; hence, when using invective, the critic should be
aware of the risks involved.
Care must be taken to distinguish between comment and mis-
statement of fact. To be privileged, the facts upon which the
citicism is based must be true or, if false, the critic's right to
state them must be privileged. Comment is the expression of an
opinion or conclusion which has a factual basis. Its legal justifica-
tion rests on the "fairness" of the conclusions which were drawn
from established facts. The facts upon which the opinion is based
should be stated or be readily available to the readers of the
critique. The comment should have some relation to the facts;
however, the privilege is not lost merely because it expresses an
opinion with which other reasonable people could not agree.26
22. 33 AM. JUR. Libel & Slander §§ 163-168 (1959).
23. Hubbard v. Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 86 N.E. 35G (1908).
24. Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Company, 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930).
25. Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom Of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REv. 427 (1910).
26. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606 (1938).
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The law extends its protection to comments-not to misstate-
ments of fact. If the facts are described in a wholly misleading
and slanted manner, and the reader is falsely induced to believe
that a person's conduct is reprehensible or dishonorable, the com-
mentator's remarks are libelous and are not privileged. On the
other hand, if a writer accurately states the facts and infers, as
a matter of opinion or belief, that the conduct is disgraceful or
dishonorable, the words are privileged. To state a conclusion only
without discussing its factual basis can give the reader the impres-
sion that the conclusion is a statement of fact; accordingly, the
defense of fair comment may be forfeited. For example, if a
writer were to state a true fact that a policeman is addicted to
narcotics and conclude that because of this he is incompetent to
be on the police force, the words are privileged as fair comment.
However, if the writer merely states that the policeman is not
competent to be a member of the police force, the words are not
privileged; and, this is true even though the writer uses a phrase
such as "in my opinion" or similar words indicating a belief or
conclusion. The commentator should remember that the difference
between fact and opinion is not only of black or white-there are
varying shades of gray. And to the dismay of the commentator a
jury may interpret the words as a misstatement of fact when they
were intended as an opinion or a conclusion. An honest purpose or
good intention alone will not be enough to excuse the author on
the basis of fair comment. If the statement is unreasonable, mal-
icious, unfair, or made in reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity, the defense of fair comment will evaporate. 27
Although a substantial number of courts do not agree, the rule
adopted by more than three-quarters of the states in the United
States emphasizes that fair comment does not permit misstatement
or falsification of facts, even though made without malice and in
an honest belief that the words are true. This narrow rule of law
has been applied to false statements even though made unintention-
ally, mistakenly, or accidentally. 2 About one-fourth of the states
follow the broader view that if the other requirements of qualified
privilege exist, the privilege includes even those statements which
are not true. 29 These courts regard non-malicious comment or cri-
ticism as fair even though false statements of fact have been made.
The application of this rule to criticism of public officials will be
considered subsequently. This narrow or minority rule has been
adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court and will gradually become
27. 33 AM. JUR. Libel & Slander §§ 163-169 (1959).
28. Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 66 App. D.C. 280, 86 F.2d 836 (1936); Bower-
man v. Detroit Free Press, 287 Mich. 443, 283 N.W. 642 (1939) ; See Annot., 110 A.L.R.
412 (1937), supplemented in Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
29. 110 A.L.R. 435 (1937), supplemented in Annot., 150 A.L.R. 362 (1944).
PRIVILEGE AND FAIR COMMENT
the overwhelming majority rule in the United States concerning
criticism of public officials because of the recent decision in the
Sullivan case. These decisions represent a dramatic reversal of
the historical attitude that the actions of the sovereign were not
subject to criticism, even when the words were true.
CRITICIZE THE SOVEREIGN?
Although the functions of government today are of primary con-
cern to its citizens and therefore are the unquestioned subject of
public inquiry, the privilege of criticizing affairs of state is of only
recent origin. As a prerogative of the divine right of kings, the
ruler's actions were regarded as beyond the question of his sub-
jects. Criticism of the government was not only uninvited-it was
not tolerated! To criticize the ruler or the government was to com-
mit bot ha tort and a crime, punishable by the infamous Court
of Star Chamber. The Star Chamber was abolished in 1641; how-
ever, the English Parliament continued to license publications until
about 1694. Such prior restraint on publications was a formidable
obstacle to freedom of speech and of the press.
Lord Holt's comments epitomized the pre-Revolutionary War
attitude that acts of the government should not be freely and openly
criticized. The proscribed commentaries included not only adverse
criticism and untrue statements, but also words which were actual-
ly true: 3 0
To say that corrupt officers are appointed to administer
affairs is certainly a reflection upon the government. If
people should not be called to account for possessing the
people with an ill opinion of the government, no government
can exist for it is necessary for all governments that the
people should have a good opinion of it.
Gradually, criticism of the government was tolerated provided
the words stated were true; hence, truth, rather than qualified
privilege, became the primary defense. The privilege of fair com-
ment, already recognized as a valid defense concerning public of-
ferings such as books, plays, literature, and art, was gradually
extended to include criticism of public officers and candidates for
public office. Unfortunately, the courts applied the same rules to
criticism of public officers without emphasizing the differences in
policy on which the rules were based.31 This resulted in some in-
consistency and confusion in the application of the fair comment
rule.
30. 14 STATE TRIALS 1095 (1704); And see Note, 10 N.Y.L.F. 249, 254 (1964).
31. Hallen, Fair Comment, supra note 21 at 53.
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CRITICISM OF PUBLIC OFFICERS: A CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE
Although a few courts have decided otherwise, the great weight
of authority in the United States maintains that published state-
ments concerning public officers, candidates for public office, and
similar political matters are conditionally privileged. 32 When ex-
tending the fair comment rule to matters of public concern, the
courts were forced to balance the interests involved. On the one
side of the scale is the public interest in free discussion and inter-
change of ideas which requires that public officers and candidates
be subject to criticism so that society will learn the truth concern-
ing their conduct and qualifications for public office.3 3 It has been
held to be both the privilege and the duty of every citizen to
fairly and impartially criticize the conduct and qualifications of public
officials.3 4 Indeed, the law has changed significantly since the days
of Lord Holt when the government disallowed all criticism, includ-
ing words which were true. On the other side of the scale is the
right of a public servant not to have his reputation tarnished by
false, unfair, or malicious statements. Although a public officer
submits his qualifications and acts to public scrutiny when he seeks
or holds public office, he should not be asked to bear the risk of
unlimited defamation. Public service requires capable and honest
men in its ranks; hence, it is argued, if no limits are placed on
the extent to which they may be criticized, they may choose another
calling and society will suffer a corresponding loss.
In the leading case of Post Publishing Company v. Hallam,3 5 the
court denied that a man who becomes a public officer must sub-
mit himself to untrue charges of disgraceful conduct:
We think that not only is such a sacrifice not required of
every one who consents to become a candidate for offfice,
but to sanction such a doctrine would do the public more
harm than good . . . . But the danger that honorable and
worthy men may be driven from politics and public service
by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their char-
acter outweighs any benefit that might occasionally accrue
to the public ....
The fears that worthy men will refrain from seeking public
office if they are unduly criticized appear to be exaggerated. Fair
comment on public matters has its limits, and no critic will be
permitted by an antagonist to make defamatory remarks which he
knows are untrue or malicious. The electorate should be given
every possible opportunity to hear facts and comments about candi-
32. Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 34 S.Ct. 175 (1913); Gandia v. Pettingill, 222
U.S. 452, 32 S.Ct. 127 (1911); Annot., 55 A.L.R. 860 (1928); 136 A.L.R. 547 (1942);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 607 (1938) ; See generally, Notes, 15 HARV. L. REV. 159 (1902),
10 CALIF. I REV. 84 (1921), 17 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1929).
33. Pattangall v. Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 Atl. 561 (1915) ; and see RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 606, Comment C (1934).
34. Maidman v. Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Calif. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265 (1960).
35. 16 U.S. App. 652, 59 F. 530, 540-541 (1893).
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dates and holders of public office. If a critic honestly believes
that information which he possesses is true, he should not be de-
terred from disclosing it to the public because of fear of legal
liability.86 If the publisher is required to have reasonable grounds
for believing that his words are true, there is little danger that
unwarranted attacks on public servants or candidates will become
the rule rather than the exception. After considering the interests
protected on both sides of the scale of public policy, it is submitted
that the needs of a free society demand that a public officer or
candidate suffer an occasional injustice in order to encourage in-
terested citizens to speak concerning matters of public importance.
In any event, the number of lawsuits filed by candidates and by
public officers is insignificant. This is probably due not only to
the hazards which a plaintiff must face in proving his case but
also to the unsympathetic attitude of society toward public officers
and candidates who, it is believed, should be able to "take it"
and "dish it out" without running to the courts for protection.'
Included in the burden of criticism which the public officer must
bear are non-malicious misstatements of fact.
MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT CONCERNING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A substantial number of jurisdictions will not permit recovery
of damages for derogatory statements concerning public officers
and candidates for public office, assuming that the criticism is
published in good faith, without actual malice, and with probable
cause for belief that the words are true.3 8  This liberal view has
been adopted by a numerical minority of American courts and
emphasizes the advantages to society of free and open discussion
concerning its public servants and candidates for public office. A
conditional privilege is extended to defamatory remarks based on
misstatements of fact as to the qualifications of candidates for public
office and acts of public officials. The basic philosophy of this
view was succinctly stated by a legal scholar: 9
36. Note, 22 HARV. L. REv. 445, 446 (1909).
37. Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
876 (1949). The law of the press in many countries permits the person attacked to in-
sert an immediate reply in the newspaper, thus using the same weapon as his attacker.
In France, for example, the Droit de Reponse of the Civil Code gives the right of an
immediate reply to defamatory statements. The reply may exceed the scope and length
of the original defamatory statements, and provision is made for its publication by the
newspapers. French Civil Code, article 13 (Act of July 29, 1881). For a discussion of
this practice, see Richard Donnelly, The Right of Reply, An Alternative To An Action
For Libel. 34 VA. L. Rsv. 867-900 (1948). In a recent article, Professor Willard Pedrick
argues in favor of the right of reply to protect a person's reputation without recourse
to the courts. See Pedrick, Freedom Of The Press And The Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 603-608 (1964).
38. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Bailey v. Charleston
Mail Assn., 126 W.V. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943) ; Annot., 150 A.L.R. 362 (1944) ; 110 A.L.R.
435 (1937); Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962); Lawrence v. Fox, 357
Mich. 134, 97 N.V.2d 719 (1959) ; Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d
150 (1957).
39. Orrin 13. Evans, Legal Immunity For Defamation, 24 MINN. L. Rsv. 618-619(1940'). Most of the legal scholars who have written on the subject have adopted this
view. See George Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office, 23 Am.
L. REv. 363 (1889) ; Smith, supra note 16 at 115; Hallen, Fair Comment, supra note
21 at 61; Riesman, supra note 1 at 1314; Noel, supra note 37 at 897; Pedrick, supra note
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The doctrine of immunity rests on the policy that in given
situations the importance of true information is so great
that as an inducement to speech, protection will be given
for bona fide communication of what is false as well as
what is true. (Emphasis added)
Although truth is a defense, a commentator may hesitate to
criticize suspected public evils if he must first be prepared to
prove to a court that his charges are true in every detail. If the
critic does not speak out, the dishonorable or incompetent official
will escape public scrutiny, and the quality of candidates seeking
public office may deteriorate. In a significant case which affirmed
the dismissal of a libel suit by a Congressman based on a news-
paper article which charged him with anti-Semitism, Judge Edgerton
said: 40
Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the
political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine
that the governed must not criticize their governors...
The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of
appellant or any other individual. The protection of the
public requires not merely discussion, but information. Polit-
ical conduct and views which some respectable people ap-
prove, and others condemn, are constantly imputed to Con-
gressmen. Errors of fact, particularly in regard to man's
mental states and processes, are inevitable . . . . Whatever
is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
free debate. (Emphasis added)
In the opinion of James Madison, the right of free public dis-
cussion and debate concerning the conduct of public servants was
a fundamental principle of the democratic form of government
in America. He emphasized that "If we advert to the nature of Re-
publican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in
the people over the Government, and not in the Government over
the people."4 1 Criticism of public servants should not be restrained
merely because their reputations may be tarnished or because the
criticism is effective. If he must guarantee the literal truth of
assertions of fact because of possible libel suits, the critic may
impose what amounts to "self-censorship" in his publications;
accordingly, the potential critic of official conduct may not publicly
state his views at all or be so careful in his choice of words that
the full impact of his criticism is lost. A citizen who has an in-
terest in public affairs should not be held strictly accountable for
37 at 588. The opposite view is supported by one legal scholar. See Veeder, supra note 25
at 419; and, the American Law Institute followed the minority view in its tentative draft
but finally adopted the majority view in its final revision. RESTATEMIENT, TOnTs § 598,Comment A (1938), reversing position taken in RESTATEMENT, TORTS, TENT. Draft 13, §
1041 (2) (1936).
40. Sweeney v. Patterson, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 24, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942). See also,
Notes 36 ILL. L. REV. 791 (1942); 55 HARv. L. REV. 298 (1941).
41. 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 934 (1794).
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misstatements of fact if he has tried to discover the truth and
then publishes his statement in good faith and in reasonable belief
that his words are true.42
The political philosopher John Stuart Mill contends that even
false statements may significantly aid public discussion and debate
because they accomplish "the clearer perception and livelier im-
pression of truth, produced by its collision with error. ' '4 3 A critic
should, however, have substantial evidence available before he speaks
because, if sued, he must prove that the defamatory and untrue
statement was made in good faith and in reasonable belief that
it is true. If the defendant must establish the literal truth of his
remarks, not only will false statements be restrained but also
may true words will remain unspoken because of the hazards of
convincing a dubious jury. The publisher's risks are magnified by
the rule in some states that truth is a defense only if the state-
ment is made "in good faith and for justifiable ends;" accordingly,
the words may not be motivated by express malice. 44 If literal
truth is made a strict, inflexible requirement, freedom of public
discussion must deteriorate. Although an unrestrained press may
become debauched, this appears to be a remote possibility. Instead,
it seems likely that critics will temper their remarks with a sense
of responsibility that will justify the trust which has been placed
in them.
The weight of judicial authority in the United States maintains
that misstatements of fact concerning public officials and candidates
are not shielded by the defense of privilege. False statements of
fact may not be made regardless of good faith or reasonable belief
in the truth of what is stated. The rule applies to public servants,
to candidates for public office, and to other matters of public con-
cern.4 5 Although a newspaper or individual may criticize a political
candidate and discuss matters of public importance even though
the words are defamatory, immunity applies only to opinion and
comment, not to statements of untrue facts. It is argued that when
untrue words receive widespread publication, the injury to an in-
dividual's reputation would surpass any benefit to be derived from
public disclosure. Furthermore, trustworthy and capable men will
not seek public office because they fear injury to their reputations;
42. .Lailey v. Charleston Mail Assn., 12G W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943) ; and see
Comment, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 128, 129 (1964).
43. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1946). And see, Areopagitica,
32 GREAT BOOKS Of THE WESTERN WORLD, 389 (Hutchins Ed. 1952).
44. The applications of this rule are discussed by Roy Robert tRay, Truth: A Defense
To Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43-69 (1931) ; and Robert H. Wettach, Recent Developments
In. Newspaper Libel, 13 MINN. L. REV. 21-38 (1928).
45. Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (1893) and Post Publishing Co. v.
Maloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E. 921 (1893) are the leading cases supporting this view;
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947) ; A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md.
267, 176 A.2d 340 (1962). And see 33 AM. Jun. Libel & Slander § 169 (1959); Noel,
supra note 37 at 896; Note, 22 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1909). The standards of libel per se
concerning members of Congress are discussed in Note, 17 TENN. L. REV. 267 (1942).
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hence, society will lose the benefit of their services, impairing the
quality of public office. It is also argued that freedom of speech
is not restricted since the right to speak freely and openly does
not include license to disseminate falsehoods in the guise of free-
dom of expression. Mr. Justice Holmes, while on the bench of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, spoke in favor of this view:46
What is privileged, if that is the proper term, is criticism,
not statement, and . . . if . . . a person . . . takes upon
himself to allege facts otherwise libelous he will not be
privileged if those facts are not true.
There are practical arguments to support this view. 47 If a
newspaperman has too much latitude to misstate facts without fear
of legal reprisal, it may result in poor reporting and careless edit-
ing. Under the pressure of a deadline, a newspaperman may per-
mit untrue and defamatory words to "slip by." If a retraction is
subsequently printed, it may be hidden in an obscure part of the
newspaper where it will go unnoticed by most readers, or if the
retraction received publicity equal to that of the original defamatory
statement, it may be ignored by those who eagerly read the de-
famatory words. Although freedom to disseminate facts without
the concomitant risk of legal liability would encourage newspaper
"crusades" for good government, such matters also arouse public
interest and increase newspaper circulation. It has been suggested
that some libel suits result from an attempt to increase circula-
tion at the expense of an individual. 4  A publisher may gamble
on a lawsuit because the risk can be distributed among advertisers
and readers' 9 or passed on to an insurance company in the form
of libel insurance. A final argument for the majority view is that
a licentious publisher may bring financial strength to bear against
a plaintiff whose reputation has been unjustly tarnished by the
publication of false statements. When confronted with a formidable
battery of expert trial lawyers and with one-sided editorials and
publicity, a courageous person may give up in despair. If the in-
jured plaintiff is a political candidate, his tarnished reputation may
not be restored until many months or even years after the election
because of the extreme length of modern trial dockets. Libel is
no easy matter to prove against a recalcitrant defendant. Although
the public interest in free and open discussion may require an oc-
casional injury to an individual's reputation, these significant argu-
ments should not be swept under the rug of complacency.
When challenged, the defendant may prove the truth of his
46. Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 243, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891).
47. Note, 37 GEo. L. J. 404-417 (1949).
48. Note, 4 GEO. B. J. 66, 68 (1941). Suggestions for reform of the libel laws are
discussed by Richard Donnelly, The Law Of Defa mation: Proposals For Reform, 33
MiNN. L. REV. 609-633 (1949).
49. Note, 51 YALE L. J. 693, 695 (1942).
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statements or plead "fair comment. 5 0 Finally, it should be re-
membered that the violence or excessiveness of the language used
may support an inference of malice.5 1 Express malice, if shown
to exist, will rebut the defense of fair comment; therefore, exces-
sive publication is unprivileged defamation.
When facts about public servants and candidates are misstated,
the defendant usually is a newspaper or publishing company. When
applying the rule of conditional privilege, the courts make no dis-
tinction between private citizens and newspapers; hence, it is as-
sumed that both newspapers and individual citizens have the same
privilege to comment on public affairs. However, a newspaper's
privilege of fair comment does not exceed that of an individual
merely because of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the
press.5 2 The attitude of the courts placing newspapers on the same
footing with individuals as to the conditional privilege of fair com-
ment seems justified. Although publication of defamatory statements
will be more widespread when done by a newspaper, this is not
considered to be excessive publication and is justified since news-
papers are society's principle means of keeping the public informed
about its public servants. Incorrect statements of fact are not the
only source of danger; fair comment has additional limitations
which should be recognized by the journalist.
LIMITATIONS ON FAIR COMMENT: PRIVATE CHARACTER
Although he is justified in publishing unflattering remarks con-
erning a candidate's qualifications for public office or his conduct
in office since these are matters of public concern, should the
writer be permitted to attack the official's private character? The
privilege of fair comment is based on the public interest. It can
be argued that matters of merely private concern are no one's
business. A critic should not be permitted to attack an official's
private affairs, as distinguished from his public affairs. As stated
in a leading case,5 3 "In our opinion, a person who enters upon
an office, or becomes a candidate for one, no more surrenders to
the public his private character, than he does his private property."
An official should not have his private life exposed to unmerci-
ful public scrutiny merely because he is a public servant; however,
when his private character has public significance, it is another
matter. When his private character may affect his qualifications
50. In England, it is customary for the defendant to use the "rolled-up plea," which
alleges that the statements of fact which appeared in the publication are true, and all
other words are bona fide fair comment upon these facts, as stated. In America, this plea
is rarely used except in New York. It merely invokes the defense of fair comment and
the defendant must still prove the truth of his statements of fact. For a discussion of
the "rolled-up plea," see Note, 49 COLUzI. L. REv. 583 (1949).
51. Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, Inc., 351 Pa. 634, 41 A.2d 736 (1945); Note,
40 HARv. L. REV. 501 (1927).
52. Bailey v. Charleston Mail Assn., 126 V. Va. 292, 305-306, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
53. Post Publishing Co. v. Maloney, supra note 45 at 71.
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or fitness for public office, the public official's personal affairs be-
come public affairs. The remarks of Justice Burch are a favorite
quotation: "
a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny . . . so
much of his private character as affects his fitness for of-
fice . . . but . . . the people have good authority for believ-
ing that grapes do not grow on thorns nor figs on thistles.
The early cases emphasized that a person's private life should not
be subjected to the public limelight. 5 5 The privilege of fair com-
ment, according to most courts, does not protect the publisher of
libelous attacks on the private character of public servants.5 6
The argument that a person's private life should be open to
public inquiry when it has direct bearing on his official qualifica-
tions for public office is impressive.5 7 For example, if a person
has a past record of homosexuality he should not be entrusted
with military defense secrets, and a critic who exposes this fact
should be protected under the rules of fair comment. It seems
that the rules of fair comment should be enlarged to include state-
ments concerning the private affairs of public servants provided
the charges have significance as to the person's fitness to hold a
position of public trust. If the publication is reasonably based on
fact, both private and public interests would be protected.
LIMITATIONS ON FAIR COMMENT: MOTIVES, MORALS, AND CRIMES
When discussing the conduct of a public servant, should a critic
be permitted to speculate on what motivation prompted the official
to act as he did? It would seem to be within the realm of fair
comment not only to discuss what a public servant does but also
what motives are behind his actions. For example, suppose a state
senator voted against a proposed bill to increase the size of relief
payments to the unemployed. A critic published a statement
which imputed the senator's motives in voting against the bill to
a dislike of minority groups, which would have been the principle
beneficiaries of the measure. In fact, the senator's motive in voting
against the bill was not racial prejudice but rather concern for
the cost of the plan and doubts regarding its ameliorative aspects.
To allow a critic to impute dishonorable motives to a public of-
ficial's conduct may impugn his honesty and fitness for public
office. On the contrary, if the scope of fair comment is delimited
by forbidding commentary concerning the possible motives behind
54. Coleman v. MacLennan, supra note 11 at 739.
55. Post Publishing Co. v. Maloney, supra note 45 at 71.
56. Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 173 Cal. 387, 160 P. 233 (1916); Van Lonkhuyzen
V. Daily News Co., 195 Mich. 283, 161 N.W. 979 (1917) ; Annot., 55 A.L.R. 863 (1928).
57. Scholarly opinion supports this view. See Noel supra note 37 at 888; Evans,
supra note 39 at 619; -allen, Fair Comment, 8upra note 21 at 81-86; Riesman, supra
note 1 at 1289 ; Pedrick, supra note at 37 at 589.
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official conduct, freedom of public discussion would be restricted.
In effect, the courts are saying to the publisher, "you have full
liberty of free discussion provided, however, you say nothing that
counts." 58 The courts are in conflict concerning the imputation of
corrupt or unworthy motives to public officials engaged in the per-
formance of their public duties. Some courts treat such allegations
as statements of fact and not comment. Other courts exclude such
statements from the defense of fair comment by saying they are
not concerned with the public interest. Both rules impose on a
defendant who has published defamatory remarks an almost im-
possible burden of proving that his words were justified. The critic
who attributes dishonorable or corrupt motives to a public official
risks an expensive libel suit and will receive no protection from
the privilege of fair comment. The English courts and a few
American jurisdictions have adopted a sensible rule which permits
the defense of fair comment provided there are reasonable grounds
for making the allegations. 59 An English jurist's remarks are worth
quoting: 60
a line must be drawn between criticism upon public
conduct and the imputation of motives by which that con-
duct may be supposed to be actuated; one man has no
right to impute to another, whose conduct may be fairly
open to ridicule . . .base, sordid, and wicked motives unless
there is . . ground . . . that a jury shall find, not only
that he had an honest belief in the truth of his statements,
but that his belief was not without foundation.
It is submitted that the boundaries of fair comment should include
allegations of motive if the critic's words, which represent his
honest opinion, are based on reasonable grounds.
In the United States, the weight of judicial authority does not
extend the fair comment defense to untrue allegations of criminal
acts by public officers.,, A substantial minority of courts allow
such statements to be made in the public interest when the pub-
lisher honestly and reasonably believes his words to be true.6 2
Similarly, accusations of immorality by public servants are not
privileged.62 It is submitted that when allegations concerning crim-
inal acts, immorality, and corrupt motives are added to forbidden
commentary concerning a public official's private life and the require-
58. Quoted from the remarks of Mr. Justice Burch in Coleman v. MacLennan, supra
note 11 at 738.
59. Peter Walker, Ltd. v. Hodgston, 1 K. B. 239, 253 (1909) ; Tanzer v. Crowley Press
Publishing Co., 240 App. Div. 203, 268 N.Y. Supp. 620 (1934). Scholarly opinion supports
this view. See Veeder, supra note 25 at 432; Hallen, Fair Comment, supra note 21 at
75; Smith, supra note 16 at 126; Noel, supra note 37 at 887.
60. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, 770, 122 Eng. Rep. 288, 290 (1863).
61. Williams v. Standard Examiner Pub. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933); 33 AM.
JUR. Libel & Slander § 169 (1959).
62. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921) ; and see Hallen,
Fair Comment, supra note 21 at 76-80, in which the authorities are collected on a
state-by-state basis.
63. Otero v. Ewing, 162 La. 453, 110 So. 648 (1926) ; Annot., 150 A.L.R. 360 (1944).
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ment that facts cannot be misstated, not much is left to criticize.
However, the Sullivan case will undoubtedly have significant impact
on these traditional rules of privilege and fair comment.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN SPEAKS FOR THE COURT
In New York Times v Sullivan,64 the majority opinion was based
primarily on a broad interpretation of the rights of freedom of
speech and of the press. Mr. Justice Brennan's words set the tone
of the decision:65
• . . we consider this case against the background of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open;
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.
The Court denied that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech and of the press was forfeited merely because some of the
words criticizing public officials were false. Quoting the words of
James Madison,66 the Court said: "Some degree of abuse is in-
separable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance
is this more true than in that of the press."
The First Amendment does not insist on the literal truth of
the publisher's words; hence, ". . . the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered .. .-17 are not the
test of constitutional protection. Nor should the burden of proving
the literal truth of his statements be placed on the speaker. The
Court emphasized: 6 8
That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
64. The case involved Commissioner L. B. Sullivan, who supervised the police de-
partment in Montgomery, Alabama. He filed civil suit against four Negro clergymen
from Alabama and the New York Times because of a libelous advertisement published by
the Times on March 29, 1960. Plaintiff Sullivan contended that because of untrue state-
ments which appeared in the full-page editorial advertisement, his reputation was un-justly tarnished. An Alabama trial court awarded damages of $500,000 to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the lower court's judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama.
273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962). The case was subsequently appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
The advertisement praised the policy of non-violence advocated by Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. and the success of the Negro "sit-ins." It did not specifically mention
the plaintiff by name; however, he contended that certain words, specifically the word
"police," referred to him and therefore was defamatory to him.
It is significant to observe that some of the statements which appeared in thes'e
two paragraphs were false, or at least inaccurate, descriptions of what actually occurred.
For example, the Negro students sang the National Anthem on the State Capitol stema
and not "My County, 'Tis of Thee," and that the entire student body , as stated, did not
protest the expulsion of students; rather, only a majority of the student body protested.
The United States Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari because of the sig-
nificant constitutional issues involved.
The basic constitutional issue involved in the Sullivan case was the extent to
which a state's power to award damages to a public official against critics of his official
conduct is delimited by the constitutional guaranty of free speech and free press. The
U. S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court because of a
failure to safeguard freedom of speech and of the press required by the first and four-
teenth amendments to the U. S. Constitution.
65. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3 at 270.
66. 4 ELLIoT's DEBATES ON Ti FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876).
67. 376 U.S. at 271.
6&. Id. at 271-272.
PRILEGE AND FAIR COMMENT
that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are
to have the breathing space that they need to survive ....
Just as factual error affords no warrant for repressing
speech that would otherwise be free, the same is true of
injury to official reputation.
Nor did the court exclude criticism of the courts from its sweep-
ing interpretation. "If judges are to be treated as 'men of fortitude
able to survive in a hardy climate' "69 they too must be subject
to harsh criticism. The unflattering criticism directed against public
servants may be harsh indeed: 7 0
Criticism of (government officers') official conduct does not
lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.
The attitude of the Court concerning the basic issues of freedom
of speech and of the press was summarized by quoting its own
words in Cantwell v Connecticut: 71
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know,
at times resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are prominent in church or state, and even
to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordain-
ed in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability
of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view,
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy.
The Court emphasized that numerous expensive libel judgments
against a newspaper or other publisher could so frighten would
be critics that freedom to criticize would be inhibited.
Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of
such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon
those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmos-
phere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot sur-
vive . . . The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.7 2
The Suprene Court declared invalid the contention of the Ala-
bama Supreme Court which held, in effect, that criticism of govern-
mental actions can be interpreted as a personal attack on the
public official himself even though no personal reference is made
69. Id. at 273.
70. Ibid.
71. 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1940).
72. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3 at 278-279; and see Note, 42 TEXAS
L, REv. 10'80, 1083 (1964).
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to the government officer except by way of attack on his official
position. The Court emphasized that: 73
. . . by transmuting criticism of government, however im-
personal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism,
and hence potential libel of the officials of whom the govern-
ment is composed . . . [raises] . . . the possibility that a
good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his
criticism [and this will] . . . strike at the very center of
the constitutionally protected area of free expression.
The Court concluded that an otherwise impersonal attack on govern-
mental actions cannot be libelous to an official responsible for those
actions.
The High Court adopted a rule of law which prohibits a public
servant from recovering damages for untrue defamatory statements
relating to his official conduct unless "actual malice" is shown to
exist. The words "actual malice" are interpreted to mean that the
publisher knows that his statements are false or made in reckless
disregard as to their truth or falsity. The Court thereby adopted
the minority view in the United States concerning criticism of public
officials. In reviewing the record of the lower court, the Supreme
Court concluded that the evidence did not warrant a finding of
actual malice or bad faith by the Times. In the opinion of the Court,
the Times was negligent in not discovering the false statements;
however, such carelessness was not the equivalent of recklessness,
as required to establish actual malice. Was the Court's decision
sound? An analysis of the underlying issues involved may help
to place the case in a proper perspective.
ANALYSIS
The U. S. Supreme Court has, in effect, ruled that citizens and
newspapers have a conditional privilege to comment on the official
conduct of public servants. False statements of fact are protected
by the Constitution as long as not prompted by malice. It is sub-
mitted that the Court's decision is both wise and sound because
it removes a major obstacle to untrammeled public discussion.
By permitting numerous and costly judgments to be awarded
public servants under the cloak of libel, a state can threaten the
fundamental existence of freedom of speech and of the press. If
newspapers and other publishers in the United States are courage-
ous enough to publish unflattering statements concerning our public
servants' activities a state can, through its libel laws, intimidate
and harass them into silence. When the Sullivan case was being
argued, eleven other libel suits were pending seeking damages of
73. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3 at 292.
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$5,600,000 against the Times. Furthermore, five other suits asking
$1,700,000 in damages had been filed against the Columbia Broad-
casting System. Plaintiff Sullivan had been awarded $500,000 by
the Alabama courts. As implied by Mr. Justice Black in his con-
curring opinion, feelings of hostility toward "outside agitators" who
desired integration may have had ". . . at least as much to do with
rendition of this half-million-dollar verdict as did an appraisal of
damages. ' 74 In a news story which appeared in the New York
Times on April 4, 1963, it was reported that seventeen libel
suits which sought more than $228,000,000 in damages were pending
in southern courts. Although these cases and the Sullivan case
had racial overtones which aroused public feelings and hostility,
such damage suits are by no means limited to racial controversies.
The libel laws can be used to muzzle criticism of our public
servants in any kind of controversy. For example, in a widely-
publicized case, the Curtis Publishing Company was sued for
publishing statements which charged an athletic director with
conspiracy to fix a football game. A jury awarded the plaintiff
a verdict for $3,000,000. The judge gave the plaintiff the choice of
a new trial or a reduced verdict of $460,000, which was accepted.
In another case, a distinguished newspaper columnist and Hearst
Publications were held legally responsible to pay $175,000 punitive
damages.7 5
If the power of State courts can be used to award extensive
judgments against critics of the political status quo, then state
governments would have powers which previously had been denied
the Federal Government. When the Sedition Act of 179876 declared
it to be a crime to criticize the Federal Government or its of-
ficials, citizens realized that Congress had acted without wisdom,
and the Act came to an ignominious end. That brief affront to
the dignity of the First Amendment has never been repeated by
the Federal Government.77 Nor should such power be extended to
the states because freedom of speech and of the press, protected
against abridgement by the Federal Government by the First
Amendment, is also protected against arbitrary invasion by state
action through the Fourteenth Amendment. It should be emphasized
that a government is not merely an abstract concept but is also
those flesh and blood people who hold its offices and transact its
affairs. Public servants must be subjected to the harsh, bitter,
unfair and sometimes false criticism of their constituents if our
74. Id. at 294.
75. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. SupP. 36 (1954).
76. Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
77. However, an occasional attempt is made to repeat our errors of the past. A
proposal was made in November 1964, by Representative Walter Rodgers, D-Texas, to
adopt a federal libel law to prevent lies and smears In political campaigns. Although
this proposal was made in good faith, it Is a sobering reminder of the opprobrious
Sedition Act of 1798.
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democracy is to survive. Any question concerning the freedom to
criticize public officials must be decided in favor of unfettered
public inquiry.
What does the Sullivan case mean to journalists and to other
potential critics of official conduct? Have the newspapers and
other commentators been given a free rein to discuss public mat-
ters and to attack public officials? Can journalists now "shoot
from the hip" by publishing defamatory statements first and then,
only after the derogatory words appear in print, investigate the
accuracy and truth of their charges? It is the writer's opinion that
such an attitude is fraught with danger! Even a cursory analysis
of the decision will disclose many hidden dangers which lurk in
the dark shadows of the law.
Editorial comment in some newspapers gives the impression
that "anything goes" when discussing matters of public concern.s
The attitude seems to be that a journalist who publishes comments
concerning public officials and candidates need not be bothered with
the chore of first verifying the accuracy of the assertions of fact.
Does the Sullivan decision actually permit slipshod journalism in
the guise of freedom of the press? It does not. According to the
majority opinion, a public official may not recover damages for
defamatory untrue words ". . . relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." 79 Mere carelessness in failing to
verify the accuracy of the facts before publication would constitute
ordinary negligence which seems to be excluded from the rule im-
posing liability. On the other hand, should misstatements of fact
be published without reasonable grounds for believing the truth of
the words, a jury may decide that the journalist acted in "reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity" of the statements. The courts
have not hesitated to find actual malice in situations where the
defendant did not have reasonable grounds for believing his words
to be true. Although the rule enunciated in the Sullivan case pro-
tects unintentional factual errors, if a critic does not investigate
the truth and surrounding circumstances of his words, a dubious
jury may conclude that he acted without probable cause. In the
Sullivan case, the manager of the Advertising Acceptability Depart-
ment testified that neither he nor anyone else investigated the
accuracy of the defamatory advertisement by verifying the facts
in the newspaper files. Nevertheless, the Court did not conclude
that the Times acted in reckless disregard concerning the truth or
78. For example, see the statements which appeared in the Milwaukee Journal, Mar.
13, 1964, § 1, P. 18, col. 1.
79. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 3 at 280.
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falsity of the advertisement. The Court decided instead that the
Times was guilty of ordinary negligence which was not flagrant
enough to constitute actual malice. A danger exists that the press
will interpret the Sullivan decision to mean that all material which
newspaper publish need not be accurate. However, the decision
was not that broad in scope.
The defamatory material originated from an outside source.
Journalists employed by the Times did not write the defamatory
words. On the contrary, the words were written by a customer of
the newspaper and were in the form of a paid advertisement. Al-
though a newspaper owes no obligation to publish the defamatory
words of an outsider, it seems that the High Court tacitly recognized
that the source of the defamatory words was not the Times
itself. The Sullivan case must be strictly limited to its facts;
therefore, although the rule does condone inadvertent mistakes, it
is likely that it also requires that newspapers investigate the truth
of their factual assertions. The courts traditionally emphasize the
word "fair" when discussing the privilege of fair comment, and it
is undoubtedly true that this practice will continue. Journalists
should not interpret the Sullivan case to mean an end to the era
of responsible journalism and the beginning of an era of a perfunc-
tory press.
Are all public officials fair game for fair comment? The High
Court concluded that a public official must prove the existence of
actual malice in order to recover damages for libel against critics
of his official conduct. But who, it may be asked, is a public
official? The Court leaves the answer to this question in serious
doubt. Webster's Dictionary defines an "official" as one who "holds
an office, or position of authority." According to this definition,
anyone in office or in an authoritarian position can be criticized
but not those who are not already in office. Does this mean then
an incumbent public official can criticize his opponent while the
latter is denied the same privilege of fair comment merely because
he seeks public office? Although the Court does not specifically
answer this question, it does cite cases in a footnote in a manner
which indicates that the same rule does apply to candidates for
public office. 80 It seems doubtful that the Court intended to limit
the rule to people who actually hold public office. An obvious
question to be asked is whether the rule includes only significant
public officials or whether lesser public officers are also included?
It seems safe to assume that the mayor, governor, President, and
candidates for public office can be criticized; however, does the
rule apply with equal vigor to the municipal garbage collector or
to the local dog catcher? The Court does not answer this question
SO. Id. at 284.
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when it speaks of "public officials." Additional cases are needed
to define what the Court has in mind. An additional problem arises
when one asks what is meant by "official conduct"? The High
Court has not defined this term, and critics must merely guess
what this vague constitutional standard really means. In any event,
the press should be cautious in applying too broad an interpretation
to these uncertain terms, under penalty of an expensive libel suit.
The High Court has tacitly encouraged a uniform rule in the
United States concerning criticism of the conduct of public officials.
Although the case could have been disposed of on the basis of its
facts, the Court instead decided the case on broad constitutional
grounds and adopted a view which has been repudiated by a num-
erical majority of our state courts. Obviously, the Court recognized
the need for uniformity in the application of our libel laws among
the individual states. A final question to be answered is whether
the Court did not go far enough in extending constitutional protection
to public statements?
Mr. Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black in suggesting that
the press be granted an absolute privilege when criticizing the
official acts of public servants. In the words of Mr. Justice Black:"'
An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public
affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of
the First Amendment. I regret that the Court has stopped
short of this holding [which is] indispensable to preserve
our free press from destruction.
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg argues that
since judges, legislators, and executive officers, have an absolute
privilege to comment on matters concerning their official duties,
the same privilege should be extended to newspapers and to the
general public. This means that critics who misstate facts would
not be responsible even if actual malice prompted the statement.
In the writer's opinion, the Court's decision to extend only a con-
ditional privilege to critics of public affairs seems justified. A
conditional privilege requires the publisher to have reasonable
grounds for believing his statements to be true. Defamatory words
which are malicious and untrue are not privileged. In contrast
an absolute privilege is extended to legislative and judicial pro-
ceedings as long as the words are pertinent to the issues. It is
based on the principle that the public interest demands that certain
81. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297, 84 S. Ct. 710, 735 (1964). This
viewpoint is not new. See Robert H. Wettach, Recent Developments In Newspaper
Libel, 13 MINN. L. REv. 38 (1928). See generally, Leon Green, The Right To Coin-
municate, 35 N. Y. U. L. REV. 903-924 (1960); Robert A. Leflar, The Free-ness of
Free Speech, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1073-1084 (1962) * Clarence Morris, Inadvertent News-
paper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REV. 36-49 (1937) ; Joel F. Handler & William A.
Klein, The Defense Of Privilege In Defamation Suits Against Government Executive
Officials, 74 HARV. L. REv. 44-79 (1960) ; Arno C. Becht, The Absolute Privilege Of The
Executive In Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1127-1171 (1962) ; Note, 48 CoRNLL L. Q. 199
(1962).
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people be permitted to speak or write fearlessly without fear of
liability for damages. The privilege is narrowly construed and in-
cludes statements which are false, defamatory, and malicious. Al-
though an occasional injury to a person's reputation must be toler-
ated for the public good, the reputations of all public officials should
not be continuously sacrificed on the altar of free press. If a pub-
lisher could make false and malicious defamatory statements with
impunity and without any probable cause for believing his words
to be true, then the era of a responsible press would be at an end.
If an absolute privilege were extended to journalists and to other
critics of public officials, untrue, malicious, unverified, and even
fabricated allegations of misconduct could be made with impunity.
These liberal justices apparently believe that our basic freedoms
and the national interest would be best served by constant inter-
necine wars of defamation. It is difficult to see how unhindered
defamation can preserve unfettered freedom of speech and freedom
of the press. It is submitted that a qualified privilege is sufficient
to shield a commentator's remarks in every instance except where
the words are malicious-in that case, the words do not deserve
protection.
CONCLUSION
By enlarging the privilege of fair comment and by narrowing
the permissible scope of libel, the United States Supreme Court
has struck a significant blow in favor of untrammeled public dis-
cussion and inquiry. It has repudiated the ancient and obsolete
precept that "the governed must not criticize their governors," and
has embraced instead a tolerant attitude toward freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. An incorruptible and dedicated press
will not only accept the challenge but will justify the responsibility
with which it has been entrusted. The High Court's decision in the
Sullivan case has heeded the remonstrance of counsel in the historic
Trial of John Peter Zenger two-hundred and thirty years ago.
These prophetic words will echo across our great land whenever free
inquiry and public discussion is threatened:82 "Men who injure and
oppress the people under their administration [and] provoke them
to cry out and complain [should not be empowered] to make that
very complaint the foundation for new oppressions and prosecutions."
82. From the words of Andrew Hamilton, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 675, 721-722
(1735).
